~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE: 21 JANUARY 1953

RECD: JAN 21 1922Z 53

[redacted]

PRIORITY

TO: [redacted]

FOR GOV HARRIMAN FROM CHARGE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

BLUE LION

PRESIDENT CHIANG REQUESTED ADM. MELSON MEET WITH HIM JANUARY 19. ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT WAS GEN. S.K. HU AS INTERPRETER. PRESIDENT ASKED MELSON WHETHER HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH CONTENTS OF GEN. KIRK'S CONVERSATION WITH HIM JANUARY 16. MELSON SAID HE WAS. PRESIDENT THEN SPOKE IN GENERAL TERMS OF BLUE LION PLANNING AND HOW HE THOUGHT PLANNERS SHOULD PROCEED IN FUTURE. HE THEN HANDED MELSON UNSIGNED PAPER CONTAINING FOLLOWING:

QUOTE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE LANDING OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT FORCES ON THE MAINLAND

1. THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE UNITS TO BE LANDED IS TO BE SUCH AS NOT TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN AND PENGHU.

2. FROM ONE TO TWO REINFORCED DIVISIONS ARE TO BE USED FOR LANDING AT A SELECTED AREA ALONG THE COAST OF FUKIEN, KWANGTUNG AND CHEKIANG PROVINCES, WHERE THE FORCES THUS LANDED CAN SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISH AND HOLD BRIDGEHEADS AND WITHSTAND ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACKS.

3. THE FORCES TO BE LANDED ARE TO BE OF SUCH A SIZE AS WILL BE WITHIN THE LOGISTIC CAPABILITY OF THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES TO SUPPORT.

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-99-946 Appeal
By MAD NARA, Date 12/04

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4. THE AREA SELECTED FOR LANDING PURPOSES MUST BE SUITABLE FOR THE CHINESE AIR FORCE TO MAINTAIN REGIONAL SUPERIORITY IN THE AIR.

5. THE UNITED STATES MUST NOT BE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION OF THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES AND NO AMERICANS WILL BE REQUIRED TO TAKE PART IN THE FIGHTING, SO AS TO DEPRIVE THE COMMUNISTS OF ANY ALIBI OF IMPLICATING THE UNITED STATES.

6. THIS KIND OF MILITARY ACTION IS CHINA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIR, AND IS THE EXERCISE OF HER SOVEREIGN RIGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION, AND AS SUCH IT HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY OTHER COUNTRY. END QUOTE

COMMENT: POINTS 1 TO 4 ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS FOUR POINTS MADE BY CHIANG TO AMB. POINTS 5 AND 6 WERE ALSO COVERED IN THAT CONVERSATION BUT NOT DESIGNATED AS SEPARATE POINTS AND POINT 6 WAS ONLY TOUCHED UPON LIGHTLY. (IT DOES NOT APPEAR IN SUMMARY TELEGRAPHED [redacted] BUT APPEARS IN FULL MEMCON BEING POUCHED TO YOU.)

POINT 6 IS DISTURBING. IT APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPT TO PLACE ON RECORD PRESIDENT CHIANG'S VIEW THAT GRC HAS "SOVEREIGN RIGHT" TO LAUNCH A FORCE AS LARGE AS ONE OR TWO REINFORCED DIVISIONS AGAINST CHINA COAST AND THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE "ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH U.S." INCONSISTENCY OF TMJI STATEMENT WHICH OBLIGATIONS ASSURED BY GRC UNDER MDF TREATY PPF OBVIOUS. STATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED BY CHIANG AS TRIAL BALLOON TO ELICIT U.S. REACTION AND IF U.S. FAILED TO REACT MIGHT BE TAKEN (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SVCD) IN MILITARY

PORTION GARBLED - BEING SVCD

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ACTION OF SIZE DESCRIBED. SUCH MANEUVER SEEMS ALMOST TOO PATENTLY DISINGENUOUS TO CREDIT. MORE CHARITABLE AND REASONABLE INTERPRETATION IS THAT CHIANG HOPES FOR PRIVATE ADVANCE U.S. CONCURRENCE IN HIS PROPOSED MILITARY ACTION, WHICH THEN WOULD BE CHARACTERIZED PUBLICLY BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS IN TERMS OF CHIANG'S POINT 6. (NOTE, IN THIS CONNECTION, HIS PLEA TO AMBASSADOR ON SEPTEMBER 6 FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO DECLARE THAT ANY GRC ACTION AGAINST CHINA MAINLAND WAS ENTIRELY DOMESTIC MATTER.) POINT 6 THUS BECOMES A PRINCIPLE LIKE THE OTHER FIVE POINTS ON WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD AGREE AND ACT.

WHATEVER THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF CHIANG'S ACTION, I DO NOT THINK WE CAN SAFELY LET IT GO WITHOUT RESPONSE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY FOMMIN TO CALL ON HIM AT 11:30 JANUARY 22. I INTEND TO CALL HIS ATTENTION TO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN CHIANG'S POINT 6 AND GRC TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND TO STATE U.S. VIEW THAT ANY ACTION OF CHARACTER CONTEMPLATED IN CHIANG'S PAPER MUST BE MATTER OF JOINT AGREEMENT AS PROVIDED BY TREATY. I WILL EXPRESS PERSONAL VIEW THAT CHIANG HAD NO INTENTION IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN GRC TREATY OBLIGATIONS, BUT THAT POINT 6 PRESUMABLY REPRESENTED PRINCIPLE WHICH HE HOPED MIGHT BE PROCLAIMED AND ACTED UPON AFTER AGREEMENT BOTH GOVERNMENTS ON MILITARY ACTION CONTEMPLATED. HOWEVER, I WILL ADD THAT I DID NOT SEE, REALISTICALLY SPEAKING, HOW U.S. COULD EVER DIVEST ITSELF OF RESPONSIBILITY IN EYES OF WORLD FOR GRC MILITARY ACTION OF THIS NATURE. I WILL FURTHER

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INFORM SHEN THAT I HAVE TRANSMITTED TEXT OF CHIANG'S PAPER TO DEPT AND MAY RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS.

IN ANY SUCH INSTRUCTIONS, I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ALLOWED DISCRETION TO MAKE THEM TO FONMIN OR VICE PRESIDENT RATHER THAN PRESIDENT AS I WOULD LIKELY ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTY IN GETTING TO PRESIDENT AND I BELIEVE IN THIS CASE PROMPTNESS OF REACTION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN LEVEL AT WHICH REACTION OCCURS.

END OF MESSAGE

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